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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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1. When L.P. Beriya became Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union after the merger of the MVD and MGB in 1953, he began, in accordance with the resolution of the new administration to reorganize the State machinery, to cut down sharply (about 50 percent) the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (both the central administration and the provincial organs), supposedly dismissing principally old and experienced workers. Simultaneously, Beriya ordered the recall of most of the residents [resident agents] and more experienced workers from the MVD offices abroad, with the exception of the Tokyo office because of its special position.
2. Beriya reinstated in the positions of the central administration of the Ministry persons close to him, such as Colonel General Bogdan Zakharovich Khabulov (who had been removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the MGB USSR in 1946), and others with whom he had worked in the past, including those persons who had been working with him lately in the organization of the Council of Ministers [the Committee of Information]. The chief of the MGB administration for Khabarovsk Kray, Colonel General Sergey Arsenyevich Goglidze, was ordered to Moscow and was appointed one of Beriya's deputies shortly before the removal of Semen Denisovich Ignatyev.
3. There were many changes among the personnel who remained after the dismissals in the central apparatus of the MVD. Most of the workers who occupied administrative posts under Colonel General Viktor Semenovitch Abakumov and Ignatyev were dismissed. Some who were close to Abakumov and Ignatyev, especially those in the Investigation Section and in the then Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) of the former Ministry of State Security, were arrested. Conditions at that time in the Ministry of Internal Affairs were reminiscent of the years of the "big purges". Responsible workers had to go through the terrible times twice--the purge carried out by Beriya, and the more severe purge organized by Malenkov after Beriya's arrest.

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4. Lieutenant General Pëtr Vasil'yevich Fedotov, who was inactive for about two years after the establishment of the Committee of Information, was again appointed head of the First Chief Directorate (formerly the Second Directorate of the MGB).
5. To the general surprise of the officers of the Second Chief Directorate, the former chief of Beriya's secretariat when Beriya was People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General [Stefan Solomonovich] Mamulov, was appointed to the post of Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD. General Mamulov belongs to the category of administrative workers; he does not have much practical experience in counterespionage or, especially, in espionage work. Mamulov's lack of practical experience reflected in a certain measure on the work of resident offices of the MVD abroad.
6. The preparations for Beriya's usurpation of authority began immediately after the death of Stalin. At that time there were rumors in Moscow among persons close to governmental circles, and especially among the administrative personnel of the MVD, about differences of opinion on questions of state politics which had arisen between Beriya and Malenkov. These rumors seemed somewhat paradoxical because of the long and close friendly relations of these two men.
7. Besides Beriya, the following persons took part in the plot: the Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General [Pavel Artemevich] Artemyev (at one time he was employed by the MVD), and the commander of aviation in the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General Vasiliiy Stalin. [redacted] Goglidze, Kobulov, Dekanozov, and Merkulov [redacted] were arrested later.)
8. It was expected that Malenkov would put up an armed resistance because the army leaders were on Malenkov's side. Therefore, General Artemyev ordered two divisions from the Moscow Military District to Moscow in time for the coup d'etat. One of the divisions was armored.
9. Shortly before the coup, Malenkov learned of Beriya's intentions, probably from his Party agents among the persons close to Beriya, who were informed of the preparations. In turn, Malenkov took counter-measures. Through the military leaders who supported him, Marshals Konev, Zhukov, and Bulganin, two guards divisions were ordered to Moscow on an urgent basis from their quarters in the Urals.
10. All the preparations for the arrest of Beriya and his accomplices were carried out by Malenkov in complete secrecy. Among the persons who took part in these preparations were members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whom Malenkov trusted completely; they were issued arms. The officers from the Chief Guard Directorate of the MVD who were on duty in the buildings of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Kremlin were totally isolated and had no way of even guessing of the plans for the arrest of Beriya, let alone the members of the central apparatus of the MVD in general. For their part, Konev and Zhukov selected the generals and senior officers whom they trusted most and who could be relied upon in case of need.
11. One of the variations of Malenkov's plan called for Beriya's arrest at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was scheduled for the end of June 1953 (approximately the 26th or 27th). Malenkov, however, was not quite sure that Beriya would be present at the meeting of the members of the Central Committee because he had previously several times failed to appear at such meetings and had begun to disregard Malenkov in general.

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12. In spite of Malenkov's misgivings, Beriya came to this meeting of the Central Committee. By the time Malenkov was ready to speak, all the entrances and exits of the building where the meeting was held were blocked by armed members of the Central Committee, and the MVD guards were removed from their posts.

13. During the meeting Beriya felt that something was not right and tried to leave the meeting hall, but was not permitted to do so. After Malenkov had charged Beriya with criminal anti-State activities, Zhukov and Konev personally arrested him.

25X1 14. [redacted]  
 25X1 [redacted] Beriya's angry protests at Malenkov's infamous injustice,  
 25X1 then his tearful pleas for freedom, and so on. [redacted]  
 25X1 the picture of the transformation of this man, who only a few minutes  
 25X1 ago was a haughty and self-assured statesman, into a flabby distraught  
 25X1 creature begging for mercy was tragic and left a very unpleasant feeling  
 25X1 with all those who were present.

15. It is characteristic that the special legal board for the trial of Beriya and his accomplices consisted basically of responsible workers of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the representatives of the armed forces. The trial was held under conditions of great secrecy, and very few persons, even from among the leaders of the MVD of the USSR, actually knew about what happened at this trial. Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev was appointed chairman of the trial of Beriya and his accomplices.

16. After the sentence of Beriya and his group had been carried out, the main headquarters of the MVD had read at closed Party meetings the bill of indictment of Beriya's group. From the time spent in reading this bill of indictment (about five hours), one can judge the quantity of sins of which these persons were accused. In particular, Beriya was accused of inhuman cruelties and animal sadism with regard to individual persons arrested by State Security organs. It frequently happened that Beriya questioned personally some prisoner who was not giving the desired testimony, and in such cases he applied refined tortures, in comparison with which the horrors of the Spanish inquisition are understood to be child's play. In confirmation of these facts, the bill of indictment stated that the investigating organs had material evidence in the form of the instruments of torture used by Beriya and found during the search of his personal belongings.

17. Further, Beriya was accused of complete moral and personal corruption. In confirmation, the bill of indictment cited the fact that during the time which Beriya had lived in Moscow (since 1938) he had seduced a great number of Moscow girls (the statement indicated "over two hundred"). Many pages of the indictment were devoted to Beriya's romantic adventures; examples were given of Beriya's taking incognito evening walks along the Moscow streets, picking out young girls of his taste, and ordering the guards who accompanied him to bring the victims he had chosen to his private house. (Beriya preferred to live outside the Kremlin walls in a completely isolated, large private house in the vicinity of the Vosstaniye Square.) The girls who, in spite of his persuasions, refused to give in to him, which happened seldom, were subjected to threats and terrorized. All his victims were listed in writing, with notations of a cynical nature made by Beriya on the feminine charms of the objects of his desire. These notes were also found during the search of his private belongings.

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18. The crimes of Beriya and his accomplices against the State formed the main part of the bill of indictment. This part described at length the espionage Beriya did for foreign intelligence organizations and his anti-Soviet subversive activity in the sphere of Socialist construction. The statement was simply a paper with greater detail than the official announcement of the Soviet Government about the arrest of Beriya and his accomplices.
19. The same evening the employees of the central apparatus of the MVD were ordered to destroy all pictures of Beriya. Shortly afterwards began the arrests of the leading personnel of the MVD. Malenkov appointed a special commission of the Central Committee under the chairmanship of Nikolay Nikolayevich Shatalin [redacted] with the task of carrying out a general purge among the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (central administration as well as provincial branches). In other words, there began the hunting for and the destruction of Beriya's partisans--large and small.
20. Several days after Beriya's arrest, Party meetings were held in each administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on orders from the Central Committee. These meetings bore the usual character expressions of indignation towards the "enemy of the people" and self-flagellation for the lack of the required political and "Chekist" alertness. Usually at such meetings some scapegoats are found for sins which until then have been known to no one, and secret enemies of the Soviet regime are "denounced". This is what also happened at the meeting of the workers of the Second Chief Directorate. One of the speakers declared that the chief of a department, a specialist in intelligence, Colonel Fedoseyev, was a partisan of Beriya and that he should be handed over to the investigating organs. According to the speaker, Beriya personally was training Colonel Fedoseyev for a trip to Yugoslavia, where he was to conduct some kind of very important negotiations on state affairs with Marshal Tito. In proof of his words, the speaker added that a personal letter addressed to Tito was found in Beriya's private safe, and that it was this letter that Colonel Fedoseyev was to deliver to Tito. Fedoseyev most categorically denied the accusations; however, he was later arrested.
21. After Beriya's arrest a thorough purge was made of the personnel of the central apparatus of the MVD, its oblast and kray administrations, and also the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the union republics, especially in Georgia and Armenia. Many of the leading workers were arrested.
22. [redacted] as a result of the measures taken and the liquidation of the remains of "Beriyaism", the system of the State Security organs became incomparably more democratic, and that the struggle against bureaucratism, bad organization, and arrogance of individual chiefs was carried on decisively, especially in the Second Chief Directorate. For example, Colonel A.M. Korotkov, who was noted for his rudeness and his contemptuous attitude toward his subordinates, became almost a saint as a result of these measures.

#### Personnel Connected with the Beriya Purge

23. Army General Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov, an old "Chekist", worked with Beriya in the Caucasus for a long time. He was a very well educated and cultured man, and during World War II he wrote several plays, one of which, entitled Engineer Sergeyev, was produced in 1944 by the Moscow Malyi Theatre and met with great success. He was noted for his calm disposition and was respected by the workers of the central apparatus of the MGB of the USSR. In 1946 he was removed from the post of Minister of State Security, allegedly because of the failure of several important

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State affairs, and also for political short-sightedness, which caused him to fail to understand the post-war international political changes and insist that the organs of State Security should be pointed inside the country. This view, expressed by Merkulov at a meeting of the Politburo, was not shared by Stalin, who approved the opinion of General Abakumov, a participant in the conference. The latter pointed out the necessity of directing all the efforts of the organs of State Security towards the struggle with the external enemy--the United States of America (from that time on, it became patriotic to call the USA "Enemy No. 1"). Shortly after this meeting, Merkulov was removed from the post of Minister, and Abakumov was appointed in his place. Several other responsible workers of the Ministry of State Security were removed simultaneously with Merkulov, including the first Deputy Minister, Colonel General B.Z. Kobulov. Merkulov was appointed Chief of the Chief Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad, which was a sharp demotion. Kobulov turned up in the same department, as did other MGB members who had fallen into disgrace. This department was jokingly called "The Chief Directorate of Sinners". It should be noted that Beriia did everything possible to have Merkulov retained in his post; but, in spite of Stalin's high regard for him, to everybody's surprise, he did not succeed for some incomprehensible reason. From then on, the relationship between Beriia and Abakumov became strained, which caused much talk in the Ministry. It is noteworthy that the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sergey Nikiforovich Kruglov, and his deputy, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, who were considered as men promoted by Beriia, likewise became unfriendly towards Abakumov, especially Serov. Serov openly dropped remarks of a very obscene character about Abakumov, and called him an "upstart", "humbag", "coward", etc.

24. Former Commissar (Third Rank) of State Security, Chief of the First Chief Directorate NKGB (where he worked for a short while in 1941-42), was Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov. The employees of the Second Chief Directorate who worked with him were amazed at his rudeness and arbitrariness. [REDACTED] Dekanozov literally terrorized the workers in the Chief Directorate, calling many of them, without cause, "spies" and "traitors". His behavior indicated that he had solid support in the top circles. Dekanozov was not interested in operational work and did not engage in it. After Dekanozov's transfer to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a number of very important operational telegrams to foreign representatives were found unsent in his personal safe. In spite of this and other serious shortcomings in his work, Dekanozov was not held accountable and, what is more, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of personnel. According to the stories told by persons who worked with him in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dekanozov continued to act in the same way, and sometimes went so far as to get into arguments with Molotov, which, from the viewpoint of employees of all ranks in the Ministry, was completely unbelievable. Dekanozov's behavior finally gave Molotov a chance to insist that Dekanozov should be removed from the Ministry. [REDACTED]

His unbelievable romantic adventures, some of which were scandalously publicized in the Ministry, served as a valid reason for Molotov to decide to dismiss him.

25. Colonel General S.A. Goglidze, an old "Chekist", had worked for a long time with Beriia in the Caucasus. For more than ten years he was chief of the MGB for the Khabarovsk Krai, and at the same time held the post of representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR for the Far East. He was very influential in the central apparatus of the MGB and was close to Merkulov and Beriia.

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He sometimes even met Stalin unofficially. After Abakumov's appointment to the post of Minister of State Security, the position and influence of Goglidze were considerably shaken. Abakumov considered him a rival and did everything possible to discredit him. This is illustrated by the fact that during the period from 1947 to 1950 a number of commissions were sent to check on the work of the administration of the MGB for the Khabarovsk Kray; this had not happened before Abakumov's time.

the methods of work of these auditing commissions were often biased. After the arrest of Abakumov, Goglidze's authority was strengthened again. Shortly afterwards he was appointed Deputy Minister of State Security and stayed in this post after the merger of the MVD and MGB.

26. Colonel General B.Z. Kobulov, an old "Chekist", worked with Beriya in the Caucasus. He was Merkulov's deputy, carrying out the immediate direction of the /Former/ Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) of the MGB.

27. According to many authoritative persons who had contacts with Marshal Konev in his work, the idea that Marshal Konev has extraordinary abilities as a commander and that he proved this during World War II is false. There is no doubt that Konev owes his military successes exclusively to his Chief of Staff, Marshal Vasily Danilovich Sokolovskiy, who is a brilliant general.

28. Apparently Malenkov has decided to follow the example of his predecessor and utilize at trials the type of persons who are able, on orders from above, to say unhesitatingly that black is white and almost believe it.

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